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Growth that is shared—so-called inclusive 
growth—is now widely embraced as the central 
economic goal for developing countries. But 
definitions and empirical characterizations of 
inclusive growth vary widely. In this brief, 
inclusive growth is defined as growth that builds a 
middle class. Macroeconomic policies can shape 
the environment and incentives for inclusive 
growth in three important areas: fiscal discipline, 
the more rule-based the better; a “fair” fiscal 
policy with respect to revenues and expenditures; 
and a business-friendly exchange rate. Although 
these policies are not underlying causes of growth, 
they are conducive to growth. The analysis here 
relies heavily on the experiences of the mostly 
middle-income countries in Latin America. 
From Pro-Poor Growth to Inclusive “Middle-
Class” Growth  
In the past several decades, pro-poor growth 
emerged as a gentle counterpoint to a singular 
concern with growth alone (measured in terms of 
increases in per capita income), while implicitly 
recognizing that growth, if not always sufficient 
for poverty reduction, is almost certainly 
necessary. Inclusive growth includes and extends 
pro-poor growth, on the grounds that growth that 
is good for the large majority of people in 
developing countries is more likely to be 
economically and politically sustainable. Sustained 
growth matters because many low- and middle-
income countries that have had long growth 
episodes—of 8 to 10 years—have subsequently 
suffered prolonged growth collapses before 
achieving real gains in human development and 
general well-being.  
  Is there a meaningful distinction between 
macroeconomic policies conducive to pro-poor 
growth and those conducive to inclusive growth? 
Sound fiscal and monetary policies that are pro-
poor are also likely to be good for the middle 
class, but whether that commonality extends to 
medium-term tax, expenditure, and transfer 
policies is less obvious. In the case of 
macroeconomic shocks, middle-class small 
business owners or semi-skilled workers may face 
greater relative losses of permanent income than 
poor subsistence farmers. 
  In the end, the possible tensions or trade-offs 
between strictly pro-poor and more inclusive 
“middle-class” growth policies cannot be 
generalized. They must be assessed policy by 
policy in each country and are likely to change 
over time as circumstances change. Policymakers 
in developing countries (and their international 
supporters and advisers) should more 
systematically consider weighted welfare 
outcomes when selecting and fine-tuning 
macroeconomic policies, rather than relying solely 
on unweighted growth outcomes or overly 
weighted poverty outcomes. Where there are no 
trade-offs, all the better. The medium-term 
benefits of good macroeconomic policy for building 
a middle class argue all the more for what are 
sometimes painful macroeconomic decisions in the 
short run. 
Defining the Middle Class 
Inclusive growth implies an increase in both the 
proportion of people in the middle class (implying 
that some people exit poverty) and the proportion 
of total income they command (implying gains at 
the “expense” of either the initially poor or the 
initially rich). The middle class is here defined as 
including people at or above the equivalent of 
US$10 a day in 2005 and at or below the 90th 
percentile of the income distribution in their own 
country. This definition implies some absolute and 
global threshold below which people are too poor 
to be middle class in any society, and some 
relative and local threshold above which people 
are, at least in their own society, “rich.” With this 
definition of middle class, an increase in that 
group’s size and economic power is likely to signal 
that the underlying growth is based on wealth 
creation and productivity gains in private activities 
and is thus self-sustaining and transformative as 
opposed to being driven largely by exploitation of 
natural resources, remittances, or infusions of 
external aid. Figure 1 shows the economic  
December 2007   2












India    Venezuela  Ecuador   China
(urban)
Mexico   Argentina
(urban)

















Source: Calculated by author using data from the World Bank’s PovcalNet <http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp>. 
Notes: Countries are shown in order of increasing average annual income per capita. The middle class is defined as individuals with at least 
US$10 a day in each year (US$7.20 in 1993 purchasing power parity, or PPP, terms), who are at or below the 90th decile of the income 
distribution in their own country. Dollar values for each country indicate 2004 daily per capita income at the 90th decile of the income 
distribution. 
 
command of the middle class, so defined, for 
selected countries in 1990 and 2004. There is no 
obvious association between the change in the 
size of the middle class and change in the Gini 
coefficient over that period. Middle-class growth is 
associated with a rising Gini coefficient in China 
and a declining one in Brazil and India. The same is 
true for other measures of inequality (not shown). 
  Latin America has for decades been the region 
with the highest inequality in the world. Latin 
America also has a history—until about 1990 in 
most countries—of high inflation, high public debt, 
volatile monetary policy, and, in part because of 
inflation, overvalued exchange rates. But in the 
past few years Brazil and Mexico have experienced 
substantial declines in poverty (using the US$2 a 
day poverty line), notable declines in income 
inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient), and 
a doubling of the proportion of people and of 
income in the middle class (Figure 1). This sharply 
contrasts with middle-class growth reversals in 
Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela. One reason 
may be that the latter countries have hewed less 
closely than Brazil and Mexico to standard 
International Monetary Fund/World Bank 
macroeconomic policies. Ecuador and Venezuela, 
with their dependence on oil exports, may have 
been more vulnerable to currency appreciation, 
which tends to be unfriendly to increasing 
employment and small business development. 
Middle-class growth in Brazil and Mexico, where 
macroeconomic policies have markedly improved 
in the past decade, suggests that eventually—with 
a long lag—better macroeconomic policy 
(combined with a benign external environment 
and a commodity boom) can contribute to 
inclusive growth. 
In the Background: Open Economies  
and Volatile Global Markets 
The discussion here assumes that developing 
countries will continue the trend of the past two 
decades of maintaining or increasing their 
openness (though more cautiously with respect to 
capital) in an effort to fully exploit the potential 
benefits of integration into the global economy. 
But because more open economies are more 
vulnerable to global financial and other shocks, 
and because the integration process produces 
losers (at least in the short run) as well as 
winners, maintaining good macroeconomic policy 
in an open economy can be politically difficult. The 
challenge is even more complicated where the 
middle class is relatively small and has little   3
command over total income (and where it is 
heavily made up of households dependent on 
state and state-protected sectors). It is, for 
example, the secure middle class in mature market 
economies that is most likely to support policies 
that favor openness, maintain price stability, and 
help ensure a competitive exchange rate. In 
contrast, the poor and near-poor (living on less 
than US$10 a day) are at more risk of losing out 
with integration because they generally lack 
sufficient education or financial assets to exploit 
global good times and are vulnerable in global bad 
times. They also have sufficient political voice to 
generate self-defeating populist pressures or, in 
immature democracies, to support short-term 
patronage arrangements that betray their long-
term economic interests. 
The Missing Middle Class in Low-Income 
Countries 
Countries with purchasing power parity income of 
less than US$1,500 or so per capita have virtually 
no middle class by the definition used here 
because daily income per capita at the 90th 
percentile is below US$10. That is the case for 
India (shown in the figure) and most countries of 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Many such countries are 
highly dependent on aid, which can account for as 
much as 40 percent of all government spending. 
The discussion of macroeconomic policies in the 
next section does apply to them, but the trade-
offs may in some cases be more difficult. Heavy 
aid inflows can, for example, complicate efforts to 
limit real exchange rate appreciation that could 
undermine expansion of small business. Donors as 
well as country policymakers should ensure that 
aid flows include adequate support for key 
investments in power, ports, roads, and other 
infrastructure. By reducing costs, these 
investments can help avoid pressure on the 
exchange rate, allowing for expansion of small 
business and increasing competitiveness in 
manufacturing, agro-industry, and services for 
export. 
Three Macroeconomic Policies That Matter for 
Inclusive Growth  
Fiscal Discipline—the More Rule-Based  
the Better 
Developing countries, especially those with a bad 
history of inflation and poor debt management, 
need to accumulate a credible record of good 
fiscal management if they are to ensure growth 
that is inclusive. Most emerging markets and low-
income countries have dramatically improved their 
macroeconomic management since the early 
1990s. They are accumulating “good” history. To 
lock in good history now requires institutionalizing 
a budget process that is transparent and rule-
based, thereby ensuring that habits and citizens’ 
expectations, as well as legislation and regulatory 
systems, support fiscal policy conducive to 
inclusive growth. Examples of good rules are legal 
ceilings on indebtedness relative to gross domestic 
product (GDP); a truly independent source of 
published estimates of revenue and expenditure; 
rules to lock in additional fiscal effort during 
booms; and for natural resource–rich countries, 
fiscal contingency funds that set aside unexpected 
revenue. Countries where the middle class is large 
and growing are more likely to have the political 
support for adherence to such rules, in what could 
be a virtuous cycle of inclusive growth and good 
rule-based fiscal policy.  
  With the exception of Chile, most countries in 
Latin America have run fiscal deficits for years and 
still do (Table 1). Past fiscal laxity meant 
governments either printed money, fueling 
inflation, or issued large amounts of debt, driving 
interest rates to onerous levels. The resulting 
inflation hurt poor people because of their limited 
capacity to protect their earnings, for example, 
through indexed savings. High interest rates also 
undermined the growth of a middle class by 
limiting the expansion of creditworthy small firms 
(which generally have no alternative to the local 
market for their financing needs) and thus of 
private investment and of jobs for the unskilled 
and semi-skilled.  
Table 1—Fiscal Deficits of Selected Countries, 1995, 
2000, and 2003 (% of GDP) 
Country  1995 2000 2003 
Argentina 1.15 2.28 0.13 
Bolivia  2.32 3.33 7.40 
Brazil 6.09
a  Not available Not available
Chile –2.58  –0.14  Not  available
Colombia  2.30 6.72 4.91 
Ecuador 1.01  –0.30  1.36 
Guatemala  0.48 1.96 1.95 
Mexico  0.53 1.25 1.30 
Nicaragua 0.31 3.85 2.92 
Peru  1.11 1.84 1.91 
Venezuela 3.61 1.65  Not  available
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics CD-ROM (Washington, DC, 2007). 
Notes: Negative values indicate budget surpluses. 
aThis value is for 1994. 
  Fiscal indiscipline is no longer the rule in Latin 
America. Average inflation fell from close to 600 
percent in 1990 to just over 7 percent between 
2000 and 2006. But past high borrowing means 
that debt service is still high. This debt must be 
financed, reducing the scope for new public 
expenditures (Table 2). In 2003 Brazil was   4
spending 10 percent of its GDP on interest on its 
public debt. To the extent the debt stock must be 
rolled over (which depends on the extent to which 
overall spending can be reduced to pay off debt), 
public borrowing will keep interest rates higher 
than otherwise, crowding out private investment 
and job creation. Real interest rates were very 
high in Latin America in the 1990s, reaching more 
than 10 percent on average for most countries, 
compared with 6 percent on average in Southeast 
Asia and about 5.6 percent in the United States. 
Since 2001 interest rates have fallen against a 
backdrop of fairly low inflation in most Latin 
American countries, but they remain well above 
those in other regions. Of course some public debt (to 
finance small deficits) is reasonable, especially when 
economic growth ensures that the ratio of debt to GDP 
does not continually rise above a safe range. But 
emerging market economies with a history of inflation 
and volatility (including some outside of Latin America 
such as the Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey) should 
probably meet a tougher standard of net public debt to 
GDP than the standard for developed countries—the IMF 
suggests no more than 30 percent for emerging 
markets.  
Table 2—Total Debt Service and Total Debt Stock for 
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(% of GDP) 
Country 1990  2005  1990  2005  1990 2005
Argentina
  37 21 64
a 46
b 44  62 
Brazil 22  45  8  27
c 26 23 
Mexico  21 17 28 68 40 21 
Peru  11 26 14 40 76 36 
Malaysia 13  6  37  39
d 35  39 
Indonesia 33  25  46 43
e 61  48 
Thailand 17  15  54
f 53  33 29 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators and Global 
Development Finance (Washington, DC, 2007). 
Notes: “Exports” refers to exports of goods, services, income, and 
workers’ remittances; “total debt stock” refers to external and 
domestic debt. 
aData are for 2003. 
bData are for 2004. 
cData are for 1998. 
dData are for 2003. 
eData are for 2004. 
fData are for 2003. 
  History hurts in another way. Given high existing 
debt, Latin American and other developing-country 
governments determined to avoid new bouts of inflation 
have had to maintain tight fiscal policies in the past 
decade in several cases even in the presence of primary  
surpluses as high as 4 and 5 percent of GDP—that is, 
fiscal surpluses net of interest payments (Table 3). This 
situation has reduced the fiscal space for public 
investment in roads, schools, health care, police training, 
and so on—services on which the poor rely heavily. In 
an unhappy combination, past high public borrowing in 
Latin America may be contributing to the crowding out 
of private investment while high primary surpluses to 
finance debt service on current and past borrowing may 
be reducing public investment compared with countries 
in East Asia (Table 4). 
Table 3—Primary Surpluses in Selected High-Debt 
Emerging-Market Countries 
Country 
Year with Highest  
Primary Surplus  




(% of GDP) 
Argentina  1.5 (1993)  0.9 
Brazil 3.9  (2002)  3.9 
Bulgaria  9.2 (1996)  1.5 
Costa Rica  2.9 (1993)  –0.3 
Ecuador  7.1 (1990)  4.5 
Egypt
a Not  available 2.6 
India  –1.2 (1997)  –3.7 
Indonesia  3.8 (1990, 2002)  3.8 
Jordan  Not available  –1.2 
Lebanon  3.0 (2002)  3.0 
Malaysia  10.2 (1997)  3.1 
Morocco  3.4 (1992)  –0.2 
Nigeria  10.5 (1990)  1.6 
Pakistan  2.8 (2001)  2.4 
Panama  7.2 (1992)  2.0 
Philippines  5.9 (1994, 1996)  –0.6 
Turkey  5.5 (2001)  4.1 
Uruguay  2.9 (1992)  0.3 
Source: K. Derviş and N. Birdsall, A Stability and Social Investment 
Facility for High Debt Countries, Working Paper 77 (Washington, 
DC: Center for Global Development, 2006). 
aData are for 1999. 
Table 4—Average Public and Private Investment in 









Brazil  4.53 15.77 20.29 
Mexico  3.58 17.69 21.28 
Argentina  1.98 15.70 17.68 
Venezuela 9.93  7.10  17.03 
Peru  3.47 17.74 21.22 
South  Korea  7.82 27.95 35.77 
Malaysia  12.33 25.79 38.12 
Indonesia  7.92 20.96 28.89 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Network Growth 
Database, 2001 <http://www.econ.worldbank.org>.   5
  Another consequence of past fiscal indiscipline is the 
inability to implement countercyclical fiscal spending 
during economic downturns. During recessions in 
developed countries, governments increase spending on 
unemployment, food stamps, and other safety net 
programs. The resulting increases in public spending 
protect the poor and help insulate the middle class, 
while helping to stimulate a sluggish economy. Such 
countercyclical measures, however, rely on the 
confidence of (domestic and external) market creditors 
in the government’s willingness and ability to honor the 
new debt and on the local financial sector’s ability to 
absorb new debt. Except for Chile, countries in Latin 
America have not been tested on this score since the 
2001 debt crisis in Argentina. 
  In short, Latin American countries are still paying 
for fiscal indiscipline that mostly ended more than a 
decade ago. With the recent global economic boom, 
most have grown fast enough and kept overall fiscal 
deficits low enough to get ahead of the 
destructive debt dynamic in which the burden of 
past debt undermines aggregate growth. But 
continued progress relies heavily on more years of 
very tight fiscal policy (unless growth rates jump 
to Asian levels) and perhaps too heavily on a 
continuation of an unusually benign external 
environment, particularly for commodity 
producers. 
  Fiscal probity also helps limit the volatility that 
hurts the poor and the productive middle class. 
The poor and middle class gain less during booms 
and are the first to lose jobs during busts (those 
who already have real and financial assets gain 
most). When volatility leads to financial crisis, it 
also involves inequitable wealth transfers that 
create enduring adverse distributional effects. 
Evidence from the financial crises of the late 
1990s in Asia and Latin America shows that many 
poor and middle-income households did not 
recover assets they liquidated during severe 
downturns. 
  Volatility is the outcome of many factors, 
including fluctuations in commodity prices and 
foreign capital inflows over which governments in 
developing countries have limited control. Latin 
America’s past patterns of stop-and-go spending 
(driven sometimes by periods of populist 
governments) have been a factor too, however. By 
accommodating this fiscal indiscipline, monetary 
policy further undermined investor confidence, 
raising interest rates and limiting job creation. The 
region’s stronger fiscal position today, along with 
more flexible exchange rates and improved 
financial regulation and supervision, bode well—
but the recent calm may also rely mostly on ample 
global liquidity (itself at risk at this writing in 
August 2007) and buoyant export markets. 
A “Fair” Tax and Redistribution System 
Inclusive growth requires not only keeping 
aggregate spending in line with aggregate 
revenues, but also adhering to generally 
progressive tax systems and expenditures. The 
experience in Latin America is discouraging. The 
value-added tax, which is generally regressive, 
accounts for 60 percent of total revenue in Latin 
America, compared with 30 percent in Europe. 
More progressive and higher overall taxation in 
Europe reduce income inequality, and probably the 
burden on the middle class, much more than in 
Latin America, where loopholes and exemptions 
tend to reduce the tax burden on the rich, and tax 
evasion is rampant. Finally, high payroll taxes 
discourage job creation, hurting the poor and 
middle-income groups more than the rich, whose 
income comes relatively more from capital. 
Revenue generation averages just 18 percent, well 
below what might be expected given average per 
capita income. Low revenue generation combined 
with admirable fiscal discipline constrains public 
investments and expenditures that could otherwise 
be deployed to reduce inequality and induce more 
inclusive growth. Equally to the point, more visibly 
fair tax systems would not only encourage 
inclusive growth, but also make higher ratios of 
taxes to GDP more politically acceptable, including 
to the rich who now easily justify evasion (more 
efficient public spending and less corruption would 
also have this effect). In Argentina the effective 
average tax rate for the top 10 percent of 
households was estimated at 8 percent in the late 
1990s. (In Africa the problem is heavy reliance on 
trade and other indirect taxes; relatively high 
taxes on imports raise input costs for businesses 
and keep consumer prices higher than otherwise.)  
  Greater spending—on health, education, and 
public infrastructure—as long as it is minimally 
efficient, is one key to more inclusive growth. 
Experience in Latin America also shows that the 
most inefficient, non-inclusive spending occurs in 
poorly designed and politically driven pension 
programs. In Latin America, the richest quintile of 
the population receives on average about 60 
percent of net pension benefits (full benefit 
amount received minus total contributions), 
whereas the poorest quintile receives only 3 
percent. 
A Business-Friendly Exchange Rate 
A competitive exchange rate is helpful to inclusive 
growth because success in manufactured exports 
is almost always associated with investment in 
new enterprises and creation of jobs for the semi-
skilled—in Japan and then Korea and Taiwan in 
the 1950s and 1960s, and more recently in   6
China, Mauritius, and Vietnam. When Latin 
American countries monetized their high fiscal 
deficits, the results were inflation, persistently 
overvalued exchange rates throughout the 1970s 
and even in the 1980s, and excessive borrowing. 
Countries then attempted to protect local 
industries via tariffs and other barriers, reducing 
competitiveness. Over the past two decades, 
Chile, with a longer history of fiscal rectitude, has 
been best able to manage its exchange rate to 
limit appreciation. 
  Fiscal discipline does not guarantee a 
competitive exchange rate. Governments can get 
away with high deficits while avoiding currency 
appreciation if, as in India until recently, capital 
markets are closed, private savings to finance 
public debt can be captured, growth prospects are 
especially good, and people have confidence in 
the currency. But in most developing countries, 
maintaining a competitive exchange rate is likely 
to help ensure inclusive growth. The increase in 
the size of the middle class in urban China (Figure 
1) is the outcome of multiple factors, including the 
country’s undervalued exchange rate. In Brazil and 
Mexico, the slaying of inflation in the early 1990s 
has made it easier to avoid overvaluation, which 
hurt exports for the two prior decades.  
Conclusion: From Pro-Poor to Inclusive, 
Middle-Class Growth  
The middle class in all economies depends on a 
stable macroeconomic environment. Economic 
volatility—due to high fiscal deficits, poor 
monetary policy, unsustainable public borrowing, 
undervalued exchange rates that temporarily make 
imports cheap, and inflation—is bad for the 
incipient middle class. The experience of mature 
Western economies suggests that poor people 
benefit when an economically strong middle class 
insists on accountable government and supports 
universal and adequate public services, by paying 
taxes. That experience suggests that inclusive 
growth as defined here will benefit poor people 
both directly and indirectly, by helping them 
escape poverty. Perhaps it is not a coincidence 
that the two countries in Latin America that have 
sustained cash transfer programs for the very poor 
are two where the ranks and economic weight of 
the middle class have doubled. It is hard to 
imagine that this would have been possible 
without more than a decade of sustained, tough 
fiscal and other macroeconomic policies. 
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